Recent cross-country empirical analysis has found that privately produced ratings of the performance of the central government bureaucracy in areas such as corruption and red tape are significant predictors of economic performance. We argue that several relatively simple, easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict these ratings: competitive salaries, internal promotion and career stability, and meritocratic recruitment. We collect a new data set on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries. Controlling for country income, level of education, and ethnolinguistic diversity, we find that our measures of bureaucratic structure are statistically significant determinants of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies. Meritocratic recruitment is the most important structural feature for improving bureaucratic performance, followed by internal promotion and career stability. The importance of competitive salaries could not be clearly established.
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I. Introduction
The important role of the quality of state institutions in the process of economic growth and development is being increasingly recognized in recent research. The revisionist studies of South Korea by Amsden (1989) and Taiwan by Wade (1990) brought into currency the term "developmental state." The World Bank broadened the focus to state institutions in the rest of East (and Southeast) Asia in The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993) . The use of institutional ratings produced by country risk services for international investors permitted extension of this line of research to cross-country statistical analysis by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) . Indices of "institutional quality" based on these ratings are now becoming standard explanatory variables in cross-country growth regressions (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1996) .
In this paper we will be especially concerned with ratings of the performance of the central government bureaucracy. Keefer and Knack (1993) use ratings by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and by Business and Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) of "corruption in government" and "bureaucratic delays," respectively; Mauro uses ratings by Business International (BI) of "corruption" and "bureaucracy and red tape;" and Knack and Keefer (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1996) use an ICRG rating of "bureaucratic quality" in their indices of institutional quality. Keefer and Knack find that better performance on both of their variables is positively and significantly associated with growth in per capita income, Mauro finds that better performance on both of his variables is positively and significantly associated with the private investment share of GDP, and Knack and Keefer and Easterly and Levine find positive and 2 significant effects of their institutional quality indices on growth in per capita income.
While the cross-country statistical evidence reinforces the idea that differential governmental performance may have an impact on economic growth, it tells us little about what kind of institutional characteristics are associated with lower levels of corruption or red tape. If the findings just listed are meaningful, it is worth identifying which characteristics of government bureaucracies lead to good ratings from the ICRG, BERI, and BI on the variables cited above. This is our aim in the present paper. In a companion paper (Evans and Rauch 1997) we examine the direct impact of bureaucratic structure on economic performance.
To achieve this aim required a major data collection effort. Although it is increasingly recognized that without the help of the central government bureaucracy, it is difficult if not impossible to implement or maintain a policy environment that is conducive to economic growth, this recognition has not spurred any institutional initiative to maintain a data base on the characteristics of state bureaucracies. Certainly there exist many fine case studies, but to our knowledge no previous set of quantitative, internationally comparable data has been assembled on this subject.
Our data collection and analysis will be guided by what we call the "Weberian state hypothesis." Drawing on the original insight of Weber (1968 Weber ( [1904 Weber ( -1911 ), Evans (1992 Evans ( , 1995 argues that replacement of a patronage system for state officials by a professional state bureaucracy is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a state to be "developmental."
The key institutional characteristics of what he calls "Weberian" bureaucracy include meritocratic recruitment through competitive examinations, Civil Service procedures for hiring and firing rather than political appointments and dismissals, and filling higher levels of the hierarchy through 3 1 In previous work, studied the potential impact that bureaucratic professionalism could have on the positive role that the state can play in economic development by providing complementary inputs for the private sector. Specifically, he hypothesized that establishment of a professional bureaucracy in place of political appointees will lengthen the period that public decision makers are willing to wait to realize the benefits of expenditures, leading to allocation of a greater proportion of government resources to long>gestation period projects such as infrastructure. He also hypothesized that this increased government investment in inputs complementary to private capital will increase the rate of economic growth. These hypotheses were tested using data generated by a "natural experiment" in the early part of this century, when a wave of municipal reform transformed the governments of many U. S. cities. Controlling for city and time effects, adoption of Civil Service was found to increase the share of total municipal expenditure allocated to road and sewer investment, while other reforms adopted during this period did not have this effect. This share in turn was found to have a positive effect on growth in city manufacturing employment. internal promotion.
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To test the Weberian state hypothesis (actually several related hypotheses), we collected original data on various elements of bureaucratic structure for 35 countries. The next section of this paper describes our hypotheses more fully and contrasts them with other views of the determinants of bureaucratic performance. Section III gives the details of how we collected our data. Section IV presents our empirical results, the robustness of which is examined in section V.
Our conclusions and suggestions for further research are in section VI.
II. Theoretical approach
In the economics literature, bureaucratic performance is typically addressed using a principal-agent model. The case studies described by Klitgaard (1988) leave little doubt that a powerful and determined outside monitor (principal) can reduce corruption and improve delivery of services by his bureaucratic agents. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) give a comprehensive theoretical treatment of the strategies a principal can use to elicit better performance from his 4 2 Another strand of the literature addresses the effects of interagency competition on corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978, Shleifer and Vishny 1993) . In this paper we only examine intraagency bureaucratic structure. agents, such as performance-based pay and (implicit) tournaments among employees for higherlevel positions.
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A drawback of the principal-agent approach is that to some extent it assumes away the problem, especially in an LDC context, because the political will to engage in vigorous monitoring and implement appropriate strategies is lacking, or worse yet the principal is himself corrupt. Rose-Ackerman (1997, p. 48) notes that "behind all proposals for civil service reform is an effective set of internal controls or of antibribery laws with vigorous enforcement," leaving one to wonder what can be done if vigorous enforcement is not available. It follows that reforms that make weaker demands on outside monitors or the political system for their implementation and enforcement are of considerable interest.
We believe that the reforms that constitute the Weberian state have this property.
Enforcement of meritocratic recruitment requires verification of whether entry into government service has been conditioned on passage of a civil service exam or attainment of a university degree. Implementation of internal promotion requires that higher-level agency positions be filled by current agency employees or at least current members of the civil service. Maintenance of competitive salaries requires a simple comparison with private sector numbers. It is precisely the relative ease with which one can observe whether and to what extent these rules are being followed that makes possible our empirical analysis below. In contrast, consider the effort that must be made to evaluate "performance" in pay for performance schemes (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, pp. 464-469) , or the initiative that must be taken to implement "strong financial 5 management systems that audit government accounts and make financial information about the government public" (Rose-Ackerman 1997, pp. 49-50) .
How do the ingredients of the Weberian state combine to produce good bureaucratic performance? We first present an argument based on Evans (1992 Evans ( , 1995 . Making entry to the bureaucracy conditional on passing a civil service exam or attainment of a university degree, and paying salaries comparable to those for private positions requiring similar skills and responsibility, should produce a capable pool of officials. The stability provided by internal promotion allows formation of stronger ties among them. This improves communication, and therefore effectiveness. It also increases each official's concern with what his colleagues think of him, leading to greater adherence to norms of behavior. Since the officials entered the bureaucracy on the basis of merit, effective performance is likely to be a valued attribute among them rather than, say, how much one can accomplish on behalf of one's clan. The long-term career rewards generated by a system of internal promotion should reinforce adherence to codified rules of behavior. Ideally, a sense of commitment to corporate goals and "esprit de corps" develop.
The work of attempts to marry the Weberian state hypothesis to a principalagent framework. Internal promotion is defined as recruiting the principal from the ranks of the agents. Only the principal exercises power in the sense of deciding (or at least influencing) the mix of services the bureaucracy will supply. Individuals are assumed to differ in their desire to impose their preferences over collective goods on the public. Imposing preferences requires that the bureaucracy as a whole be effective in fulfilling its mission. A principal who values exercise of power highly will spend more time supervising his agents to insure that they are carrying out their tasks (and thereby implementing his preferences), and less time looking for ways to line his own 6 3 Overall, the Weberian state hypothesis is similar to a "Williamsonian" (1985) argument that governance structures that limit the extent of competition may sometimes have more than compensating benefits. pockets. With internal promotion, agents who hope to exercise power themselves will be more responsive to any effective supervision in order to increase their chances of becoming principal.
Since agents who care about power are more likely to become principal, principals are more likely to care about power and therefore supervise their agents more closely. It follows that given any positive initial level of supervision, internal promotion generates a virtuous circle that increases (in expectation) the value the principal places on exercise of power, tending to increase the extent to which the bureaucracy as a whole carries out its assigned tasks of public goods provision and decrease the extent to which it implicitly taxes the private sector through large-scale corruption.
Competitive salaries and meritocratic recruitment are of only secondary importance for bureaucratic performance in this model.
The arguments of both Evans (1992 Evans ( , 1995 and for the virtues of the Weberian state are based largely on the effects of selection and the development of norms. A more standard incentive-based analysis may reach different conclusions. Regarding meritocratic recruitment, a civil service system typically entails not only examinations but also civil service protection, and it could be argued that bureaucrats with civil service protection are less motivated to perform since it is more difficult to fire them. Exams and other credentials may not select for relevant skills but instead may function mainly as barriers to entry that shield incumbent officials from competition from qualified outsiders. Similarly, internal promotion may simply prevent the best candidates from being appointed to higher positions when they are open.
3 Only regarding the benefits of competitive salaries will the standard analysis agree, pointing in particular to the 7 4 We sent out questionnaires to 231 experts and received back 126 complete responses. Of these respondents, 103 were academics, split roughly evenly between institutions based in the countries in question and institutions based in more developed countries. Returned questionnaires were often accompanied by copies of the author's published analyses or extensive commentary. 5 This sample was chosen on the basis of industrial output per capita and the share of industrial production in GDP. It has been analyzed by Feder (1983) and Esfahani (1991) . reduction in the incentives to take bribes given the presumed reduction in the marginal utility of income and increase in the disutility of being fired if one is caught in corrupt activity.
III. Collection of original data
Our collection of data on bureaucratic structure proceeded in three steps. First, we developed and pretested a survey to be filled out by country experts. Second, we identified a sample of countries for which we thought it was feasible to collect accurate data on the core economic agencies. Third, we sent out the final version of our survey with the goal of obtaining responses from at least three experts per country for purposes of cross-validation. We met this goal in all but three cases (see Table A1 ). This was a very laborious process for two reasons: (1) we had to identify experts and (2) we had to get the experts to respond. If the experts we identified initially did not respond, we had to identify new ones. Although we restricted our sample in anticipation of this difficulty, more than two and one-half years elapsed between the time we began to send out the final version of our survey and the time we completed our data set. 4 The sample of 35 countries shown in Table A1 began with the 30 "semi-industrialized" countries of Chenery (1980) . 5 We believed this would cover a much broader range of 8 6 Moreover, for purposes of our companion study we believed that the role of the state in economic development was more important for this group of countries. 7 The countries included in Figure 2 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. (1980)) 7 is concentrated at the high end while the distribution for the semi-industrialized countries is much more spread out. These figures also suggest, however, that by excluding countries that
were not at least "semi-industrialized" the Chenery sample may be cutting off the lower end of the distribution of bureaucratic performance. For this reason we decided to add five countries that were insufficiently industrialized to be included in the Chenery sample: Haiti, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zaire. These choices were driven by the desire to increase the representation of the Caribbean, South Asian, and Sub-Saharan African regions, and by the belief that there was sufficient scholarship on these countries to enable one to find at least three experts for each of them. Figure 1c shows that, as expected, the distribution of bureaucratic performance was more effectively covered by our sample than by the Chenery sample.
We have already noted that feasibility and maintenance of data quality required us to sample less than the entire universe of countries. The same concerns led us to restrict our 9 8 The respondents were asked to choose "the four most important agencies in the central state bureaucracy in order of their power to shape overall economic policy" (see Appendix). The Ministry of Finance was the most commonly listed agency, followed at a distance by the Planning Ministry/Board and Ministry of Trade/Commerce/Industry. Other agencies represented include the President's/Prime Minister's office (or Royal Palace), Central Bank, and Ministry of Defense. 9 For all questions used in the analysis below, the between-country variance far outweighed the variance among experts assessing the same country.
coverage of agencies within a country. We chose to focus on the core economic agencies. 8 This choice was obvious given that our companion study concerns the relationship between the characteristics of the agencies surveyed and overall economic performance. Using our data on the bureaucratic structure of core economic agencies to explain the privately produced measures of bureaucratic performance cited in the Introduction creates a problem if these agencies are, for example, "pockets of efficiency" with bureaucratic structures that are more "Weberian" than is typical of the rest of the state bureaucracy. Since these measures of bureaucratic performance are intended to serve the needs of transnational investors, this problem may be somewhat mitigated if these investors mainly deal with officials who are employed by (or heavily influenced by) the core economic agencies.
Our complete survey is reproduced in the Appendix. Many questions were designed for our companion study of the effects of the characteristics of the core economic agencies on economic policy and economic performance. For example, questions 12-13 relate to the existence of public/private information-sharing networks that may aid the formulation of economic policy.
The questions that we deemed relevant for this study, and their codings, are reproduced in Table   1 . We used the average of the coded expert responses for each country. 9 These questions were 10 There is some indication on the questionnaires and in the accompanying commentary of more substantial changes in bureaucratic structure after 1990. We return to this point in our Conclusions. almost always answered in terms of an assessment of the period 1970-1990 as a whole.
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Questions 4-5 in Table 1 address the extent to which recruitment is meritocratic at the entry level. MERIT is an equal-weight index of the two questions, where each question and the index itself has been normalized to lie in the range 0-1. Question 8, and to a lesser extent questions 6, 7, and 11, pertain to the extent of internal promotion, while question 10 addresses career stability. CAREER is an equal-weight index of questions 6-8 and 10-11. Question 14 concerns the level and question 16 concerns the change of bureaucratic compensation relative to the private sector. SALARY is an equal-weight index of these two questions. Descriptive statistics for these three bureaucratic structure indices are given in Table 3 .
IV. Testing the Weberian State Hypotheses
We will seek to explain the cross-country variation in the five measures of bureaucratic performance, cited in the Introduction, that are available to us from private ratings services. These are described in Table 2 , listed in the order in which we will use them as dependent variables in the data analysis. Two of these measures require additional comment. First, the definition of BURQUAL indicates that it measures not only an aspect of bureaucratic performance but also some of the same elements of bureaucratic structure that are addressed by our survey. It follows that while a positive and significant effect of our indices on this variable provides some information, in the absence of similar effects on other measures of bureaucratic performance such a finding could not be considered important evidence in favor of our hypotheses. Second, it 11 11 The actual data are for the variable RGDP1 from Penn World Tables Version 5.6. should be noted that unlike CORRUPT1, CORRUPT2 is not necessarily an indicator of bureaucratic performance: it is not clear whether the "corruption or questionable payments" in the definition are made to government officials or to private sector managers such as purchasing agents. In Table 3 , descriptive statistics are given for the time averages of the five bureaucratic performance ratings over the years during the period 1970-1990 for which they are available.
In attempting to explain these measures of bureaucratic performance, the question arises as to what control variables to include along with our measures of bureaucratic structure. Given
Figures 1a-1c above, and the likely correlation of Weberian state characteristics with country income, it seems clear that we should control for level of development. Our measure of level of development, RGDP, will be GDP per capita at the beginning of the time period for which the dependent variable is available, corrected for differences in purchasing power across countries (Summers and Heston 1991) .
11 It also seems prudent to control for country level of education.
Countries with higher levels of education may be more likely to adopt meritocratic recruitment procedures, and at the same time education could affect bureaucratic performance by enabling the population to better monitor the state bureaucracy, and may also help on the supply side by improving the pool of applicants for the officialdom. Our education measure, HUMCAP, is the average years of schooling in the population over age 25, as compiled by Barro and Lee (1993 Mauro (1995) used this variable as an instrument for the Business International measure of corruption (our variable CORRUPT2).
13 It could be argued that our measures of bureaucratic performance are qualitative dependent variables and that an alternative estimation technique such as ordered probit is more appropriate. However, an examination of the raw data makes it clear that the agencies that produced these measures perceived their ratings as continuous, cardinal variables: ratings such as 3.5 are not uncommon. Time averaging also makes our dependent variables more like continuous dependent variables.
control for the ethnic diversity of a country. Easterly and Levine (1996) present both arguments and country anecdotes supporting the view that ethnic diversity generates more competition for government-created rents, leading to greater corruption and poorer bureaucratic performance generally. At the same time, if government patronage is organized along ethnic lines, ethnic diversity may make it more difficult to replace a clientelistic bureaucratic structure with a more rule-based one. We use the same measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization used by Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1996) , pertaining to the year 1960 and originally collected by the Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the Soviet Union.
The variable, ETHFRAC, measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different ethnolinguistic groups.
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For each measure of bureaucratic performance we first examine which control variables should be included in the subsequent analysis using our indices of bureaucratic structure. The dependent variables are the time averages of the variables in Table 2 for which descriptive statistics were given in Table 3 . The ordinary least-squares regressions 13 in Table 4 show that RGDP is a statistically significant determinant of all five measures of bureaucratic performance, HUMCAP is an additional significant determinant of BURDELAY and CORRUPT2, and ETHFRAC has no additional explanatory power for any measure of bureaucratic performance.
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The only ambiguity concerning which control variables to retain in the subsequent analysis occurs for BURDELAY. There inclusion of HUMCAP makes RGDP insignificant, but also reduces the number of observations by three. We decided to retain RGDP and the larger number of observations in the regressions reported below. Retaining HUMCAP and dropping three observations does not qualitatively alter any of our findings concerning the effects of the bureaucratic structure variables. Moreover, we always checked that none of the control variables omitted on the basis of these preliminary regressions was statistically significant if reintroduced into the regressions reported below, with the exception of HUMCAP in the equations for
BURDELAY.
In Table 5 we separately add each of our bureaucratic structure indices to the regressions increases BURDELAY by 0.62 standard deviations. In short, the effects of bureaucratic structure on bureaucratic performance are neither very large nor trivial.
Since MERIT and CAREER are both statistically significant explanatory variables for CORRUPT1, BURQUAL, and BURDELAY, we tried including both variables in these regressions.
In every case, only MERIT retained statistical significance. In other words, given MERIT, CAREER did not add to our ability to explain bureaucratic performance. On the other hand, both MERIT and CAREER retained statistical significance when added separately to a regression for BURDELAY that included SALARY, the former at the five percent level and the latter at the ten percent level.
These results indicate that meritocratic recruitment is the element of Weberian bureaucracy that is most important for improving bureaucratic performance. Internal promotion and career stability are of secondary importance. Whether or not competitive salaries have any effect on bureaucratic performance is unclear.
V. Robustness of the findings
We have already mentioned that any of the control variables omitted on the basis of the regressions in Table 4 remains statistically insignificant when added back in to the regressions in Table 5 , with the exception of HUMCAP in the equations for BURDELAY. It is also the case that adding back in any of these variables never causes a bureaucratic structure index that is significant at conventional levels to become insignificant.
14 Many authors (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1996) 15 15 SALARY becomes significant at the ten percent level in the BURQUAL equation, but R 2 is lower. 16 Adding the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy causes SALARY to become significant at the ten percent level in the BURQUAL equation. When both regional dummies are included, MERIT and CAREER both drop just below the ten percent significance level in the respective BURDELAY equations, but the dummies themselves are not statistically significant. prefer using the natural logarithm of RGDP to its level, so we tried this as well. Using the natural logarithm of RGDP improved the fit of the regressions in Table 5 in some cases and worsened it in others, but never reduced the significance level (one, five, or ten percent) of any of the bureaucratic structure indices. 15 Another potential concern is that the explanatory power of our bureaucratic structure indices only holds between regions of the globe but not within regions. In the cross-country growth regression literature it has been common to include dummy variables for Africa dummy is never significant in any of the fifteen regressions reported in Table 5 , and the Latin American dummy is significant in only two of these fifteen regressions. In no case does a bureaucratic structure index that is significant at conventional levels become insignificant.
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It has been less common in the cross-country growth regression literature to include a dummy variable for East Asia (it is not covered by Levine and Renelt (1992) , for example). When using a relatively small number of observations, a major concern is that one's results are driven by one or two outliers. Figures 2a-4c show scatter plots of CORRUPT1, BURQUAL, and BURDELAY against MERIT, CAREER, and SALARY, in every case controlling for RGDP so that the slopes of the lines in the figures are given by the regression coefficients reported in Table   5 . Visual inspection of these figures suggests that the results for BURDELAY may not be robust to omission of Singapore (SGP). A computer ranking of observations by how much the coefficient on the relevant bureaucratic structure index would change confirms that Singapore is the most influential observation in Figures 4b and 4c , but shows that India (IND) is the most influential observation (reducing the estimated coefficient on MERIT) in Figure 4a . Omitting the most influential observation (Singapore) leaves the estimated coefficient on CAREER significant at the five percent level and reduces the significance level of the coefficient on SALARY from the 18 In all other equations the most influential observation reduces the coefficient on the relevant bureaucratic structure index, except for the coefficient on SALARY in the equation for CORRUPT2. It is worth noting that omission of the most influential observation would make the coefficients on MERIT in the equations for REDTAPE and CORRUPT2 both significant at the ten percent level, and the coefficient on CAREER in the equation for REDTAPE significant at the five percent level. one to the five percent level.
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Given that we find meritocratic recruitment to be the most important element of Weberian bureaucracy for improving bureaucratic performance, the index MERIT deserves closer examination. Table 1 shows that one component concerns coverage of the civil service examination system while the other component concerns coverage of the requirement for a university degree. It could be that the university degree component of MERIT is actually proxying for a measure of education (the population share of college graduates, say) that is more relevant than HUMCAP for predicting bureaucratic performance, and that this is the real source of the explanatory power of MERIT. We address this issue in Table 6 by splitting MERIT into its two components, which we call CIVSER and UNIV, and using each of these components in place of MERIT in the Table 5 equations for which MERIT was statistically significant. We see that, except for BURDELAY, the two components have roughly equal explanatory power (and less than that of the combined index), as measured by R 2 . Apparently the importance of MERIT for bureaucratic performance cannot be explained away in this manner.
Finally, we must note the possibility that the statistical relationships we observe are due to good bureaucratic performance somehow producing high values of our bureaucratic structure indices rather than the other way around. We find this reverse causality to be implausible in part because our reading of the expert commentary accompanying the questionnaires suggests that in most cases the bureaucratic structures reported for the period 1970-1990 had already been in place for some time, while the bureaucratic performance measures all pertain to the 1980s except for BURDELAY, which starts in 1972. The roots of certain bureaucratic structures may extend back for generations, as is the case in a number of countries for the extent of civil service coverage (Evans 1992 (Evans , 1995 .
VI. Conclusions
Without the help of the state bureaucracy, it is difficult if not impossible to implement or maintain a policy environment that is conducive to economic growth. We have argued that several relatively simple, easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies: competitive salaries, internal promotion and career stability, and meritocratic recruitment. We collected a new data set on these features for the core economic agencies of 35 less developed countries. Controlling for country income, level of education, and ethnolinguistic diversity, we found that our measures of bureaucratic structure were statistically significant determinants of three out of five privately produced measures of bureaucratic performance that other studies have found to have a positive impact on economic growth and private investment. In particular, our results indicate that meritocratic recruitment is the element of bureaucratic structure that is most important for improving bureaucratic performance. Internal promotion and career stability are of secondary importance. Whether or not competitive salaries have any effect on bureaucratic performance is unclear.
An especially valuable direction in which to extend the research presented in this paper is longitudinal analysis. In particular, the questionnaires and accompanying commentary suggest 19 that the early 1990s was a period of important changes in the bureaucracies of less developed countries. This provides an opportunity to resurvey the bureaucratic structures of our sample of 35 countries focusing on the period 1990-1995, and test if changes in our bureaucratic structure indices led to significant changes in bureaucratic performance in the latter half of this decade.
This should provide insight not only into the robustness of our results but also into the efficacy of the 1990s round of less developed country "administrative reforms." 1970 -1990 . In answering the following questions, assume that "higher officials" refers to those who hold roughly the top 500 positions in the core economic agencies you have discussed above.]
Q4.
Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination system?
Codes: 1 = less than 30%, 2 = 30 -60%, 3 = 60% -90%, 4 = more than 90%
Q5. Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion have university or postgraduate degrees?
Q6. Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or Chief Executive)?
Codes: 1 = none, 2 = just agency chiefs, 3 = agency chiefs and vice-chiefs, 4 = all of top 2 or 3 levels.
Q7.
Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion are likely to already be members of the higher civil service?
Codes: 1 = less than 30%, 2 = 30 -70%, 3 = more than 70%
Q8.
Of those promoted to the top 2 or 3 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or (its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry)?
Codes: 1 = less than 50%, 2 = 50 -70%, 3 = 70% -90%, 4 = over 90%
Q10.
What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career?
Codes: 1 = 1-5 years, 2 = 5-10 years, 3 = 10 -20 years, 4 = entire career Ql l. What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his/her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency?
Codes: 2, if respondent circled "if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation" or "in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments" and not "in most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more" or "in most cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political appointees"; 1 otherwise.
Q14. How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extralegal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities?
Codes: 1 = less than 50%, 2 = 50 -80%, 3 = 80% -90%, 4 = Comparable, 5 = Higher Q16.
Over the period in question (roughly 1970-1990) what was the movement of legal income in these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector?
Codes: 1 = declined dramatically, 2 = declined slightly, 3 = maintained the same position, 4 = improved their position See Tables 1 and 2 for variable descriptions. 
